The Talks
Begin
The new
Turkish state had won the battle for its independence and was thus recognized
by the Western states - except for one: Britain.
This
attitude of the British continued throughout the Lausanne negotiations.
London's administration was determined not to treat Turkey as an equal or a
sovereign state, and because of this attitude the negotiations risked
suspension on more than one occasion, and even came to a halt in February 1923.365
Unsurprisingly,
the sessions on Mosul witnessed some of the most heated and tense exchanges.
British
Prime Minister Bonar Law and the Secretary of State for the Colonies instructed
Lord Curzon -who was the representative of Britain at Lausanne- that the
negotiations should continue without suspension and the Turkish side should be
persuaded. At the time, the Secretary of State for the Colonies wrongly
believed that the Turkish government would waive its claims on Mosul in
exchange for 20% of the oil revenues.366
İsmet
İnönü and his aide Rıza Nur, who represented the Turkish side, maintained that
Mosul was a Turkish vilayet and that all the Kurds living there were
Turkish citizens. The delegation of the Turkish Parliament explained in detail
the Turkish case with political, historical, ethnographical, geographical,
economic and military evidence.
İsmet
Pasha clarified his point with the following words:
The
Grand Assembly of the Turkish Republic is the government of Kurds as much as it
is Turks'. Kurds also have representatives in the Grand National Assembly.
Kurdish people and their representatives in the Assembly do not accept the
separation of their brothers in Mosul vilayet from the mainland.367
However,
Lord Curzon, in an attempt to rebut the argument of İsmet Pasha, claimed that
the Kurdish representatives at the Turkish Parliament did not represent the
Kurdish people, that they had been appointed by Mustafa Kemal, did not have
rights to representation and even implied that their election was dubious: 'As
to the Kurdish representatives of Ankara, I ask myself how they were elected'.368
Yusuf Ziya
Bey, who was a Kurdish MP representing Bitlis, gave the perfect answer to this
allegation during his speech at the Parliament on January 25, 1923:
Apparently, our delegates in Lausanne
didn't give the necessary answer to these accusations. We are the true
representatives of the Kurdish lands, and we are here not by appointment, but
by election. We took part in the elections under no pressure. If Kurdish people
wanted separation, they wouldn't have participated in this election. Kurdish people participated in these
elections despite all the efforts of British with their offers of gold. Kurds
share the same goal as their Turkish brothers.369
Statements
of the other Kurdish MPs that gave speeches at the Parliament should also be
remembered. One notable example is Diyab Ağa, the 70-year-old Dersim
representative, who was also one of the symbolic names of the Turkish
Independence War. He said:
We all
know and say that our religion, our religious affairs, origins and ancestors
are all one. We have no differences or quarrels. Our name, religion, our God is
One.
When the
MPs asked Diyab Ağa what he said to the delegation that went to Lausanne, he
responded as follows:
May
God help them. May God give the best result. Thank God, the ones that went
there are good people, pious and devout… We are all one. There is no question
of Turkish or Kurdish identity. We are all one; we are brothers (interrupted by
applause and 'bravo's). A man might have five, ten sons. One might be called
Hasan, another Ahmed, Mehmed, Hüseyin. But they are all one. This is how we
are. There is no difference between us (chants of 'bravo'). But enemies are
plotting to turn us against each other. They are trying to sow animosity by
saying 'you are like that, I'm like this etc.'… We are brothers. Our religion,
culture is one. Some people don't know this. They say a lot of things, but they
do not know. It is not how it is. La ilaha illa Allah Muhammad ar-Rasul Allah [God
is One and Muhammad is His Messenger]. That is it. (Deafening applause and
bravos).370
Süleyman
Necati (Güneri) Bey, an Erzurum MP who later took the stage, said the 'majority
of the people that voted for him were Kurdish', emphasized the concept of 'brotherhood
of land' and reiterated that Turks and Kurds had the same history, that
they weren't different people, that there weren't racial minorities in Turkey.
Yusuf Ziya
Bey, a Bitlis MP, during another speech, said the following about minorities
based on language and racial differences:
Europeans
say, 'The biggest minority in Turkey is the Kurds'. I am a true Kurd. And as a
Kurdish member of the Parliament, I can assure you that Kurds do not want
anything. They only want the welfare and safety of Turks, their big brothers
(Loud applause). We, Kurds, gladly trampled all the rights Europe wanted to
give to us with that excuse of a treaty, called Sévres, and returned it back to
them. Remember how we fought in Al Jazeera (Arabian Peninsula) (Another round of
applause). Remember how we sacrificed ourselves and joined the Turks, we didn't
leave them, and didn't want to leave them. We don't and won't want to leave
them (Another round of applause). As I finish my words, I'm kindly asking our
delegates [in Lausanne], to make sure that when the minority issue comes up,
they make it clear that Kurds have no claims or demands and that they repeat my
words here as a spokesperson for the Kurdish people… 371
Durak
(Sakarya) Bey, who was an Erzurum MP, said that throughout the history of
Islam, Turks and Kurds mingled and families became one in Anatolia.372
In a
motion submitted on behalf of Mardin MPs, the Turkish delegation at the
Conference of Lausanne was asked to declare that Turks and Kurds were one and a
whole. Van MP Hakkı Ungan Bey said that it should be made clear in Lausanne
that Kurds cannot be differentiated from Turks.373
Without
doubt, neither the Kurdish population in Mosul, nor those in Anatolia, saw
themselves any different than the Turks nor it was possible to separate them
from each other.374 The indigenous people wanted to live under the same roof as the Turks
and Kurds just like before, in other words they wanted to continue to live
under Turkish rule. Even Arabs didn't want the British mandate and declared 'it
is either Turkish rule or independence'. So much so, it became a common
occurrence for the Kurds conscripted by the Iraqi government to switch to
Turks' side.375
Before the war, in the region covering
Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, the languages used for writing had been
Turkish, Arabic and Persian. However, the British in the region took it on
themselves to develop the Kurdish language and its written form. After a while,
the British authorities turned Kurdish into a communication tool. Although the
local people insisted using
Arabic and Turkish in their daily lives and correspondences, the British deep
state was adamant on Kurdish. They stipulated that even the newspapers be
printed in Kurdish. Again, the British deep state worked to remove Turkish as
the written language and introduced a ban on its use in private
correspondences. The British deep state also sought to cancel Turkish as the
official language in the region and pursued a deliberate policy of annihilation
targeting Turks and Turkish in the vilayet of Mosul.
Academician
and author İhsan Şerif Kaymaz explains the state of affairs as follows:
It is
clear that Britain, having understood that Kurdistan will not be established
any time soon, is making long-term plans in a bid to create a national Kurdish
identity so that Kurdistan can be built. The fruits of these efforts will be
reaped in a couple of decades and a process that will create serious problems
for the future of both Turkey and the region will thus be started.376
Two people
that lived together for almost a thousand years, that mixed and built families
together, were forcefully torn apart according to a deep plan amidst the
background of war. The architect of the plan was the British deep state, the
perpetrator of all separations and divisions. For the sake of its interests, it
accepted dividing a nation, and indeed as following pages will study further
on, threatened and slaughtered them in a bid to make them indebted to itself.
The British deep state has been the architect of divisive policies throughout
history. No one could stand up to them and this mafia structure was never held
to account for its activities. That's why this horrible policy continues today.
Today, the plots around Southeastern Anatolia are the same as those concocted
for Mosul in the early 20th century. The British deep state has been
behind each and every one of them.
The
strategy that the British deep state pursued in Lausanne to drive a wedge
between the Turks and Kurds must be well studied, because the games of those
days are once again being played in Southeastern Anatolia through the PKK.
British Intrigues
İsmet
Pasha, the head of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne, sent a telegram to
Turkey on December 28, 1922. He was convinced that the British had absolutely
no intention of leaving Mosul. Only a small border correction in North Mosul
would be made and the issue would be discussed amicably.
Shortly
thereafter, British General Townshend made a surprising statement to İsmet
Pasha. He said that Britain would give up on Mosul, that they would not be the
cause of another war. He added that within a year British forces would withdraw
from Mosul and following that, the Arabs would riot against King Faisal and the
Turks would be able to enter Mosul without a problem.377
Clearly,
the British deep state had a secret agenda. The members of the deep state would
employ every tactic to gain the upper hand in the tense negotiations and
resorted to all methods to bewilder and put the Turkish delegates on the wrong
track. Indeed, in another telegram, İsmet Pasha said the British sought to
remove the Mosul issue from the scope of Lausanne; it was to be discussed later
and turned into an issue between the two states.378
Nevertheless,
İsmet Pasha saw through their plans, didn't find their suggestions convincing
and resorted to the assistance of the French government as a first step.
However, France said that the Mosul issue should be resolved between the Turks
and the British.
At the
same time, dissidents were getting louder in British parliament. Although
Curzon claimed that it was because of İsmet Pasha's obstinacy that the Mosul
issue was still a problem, it was viewed as a failure of Curzon at the British
Parliament and a campaign against him started. On December 8, 1922, former
Prime Minister Bonar Law wrote a letter to Curzon and made his stance on the
issue very clear:
… There is a great campaign started
here against you. Most recently, the letter Gounaris wrote to you on February
15 was publicized. The claim that you were the reason behind the Greek failure
and not Lloyd George is being used as a weapon against you. A parliamentary
question was submitted to investigate whether the Cabinet was aware of those letters. And I said, yes.
The issue was investigated but no conclusion could be reached. It is very
important evidence for us that your name is not mentioned not only in the
Foreign Office list, but also in the lists that Horne and Austen left to their
successors. So, rest assured. They can never blame you at all for this issue.379
It appears
that Curzon was under immense pressure by the British deep state and was forced
not to compromise on the Mosul issue. Because of this pressure, Curzon did his
best to not give away Mosul at Lausanne, as it was an important leverage for
the British deep state.
Seeing that there was no agreeing with Lord
Curzon over Mosul, İsmet Pasha
sent Turkish economist Rüstem Bey and Şeref Bey, the former Minister for Trade
and Railways, to Bonar Law, the British PM who didn't wish for the negotiations
to be suspended. This move angered Lord Curzon to no end. He wrote a stern
letter to the British diplomat Sir Eyre Crowe on January 11, 1923 and said that
unless the talks with the Turkish representatives were ended, he would withdraw
from the negotiations about Mosul.380
Later
Curzon sent another letter with the same harsh tone on January 17, 1923 to
Walter Hulme Long, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.381 He said:
As a
former colleague and friend of yours, can I ask you, how can you stick your
nose in matters that I'm dealing with here? The other day, Rickett, with whom
you are also acquainted, was here. Going behind my back and deceiving İsmet
Pasha, he convinced him to send three representatives to London, with whom I'm
sure you are familiar with.382 These representatives went to London to offer oil concessions in
exchange for the return of Mosul to Turks. I, on the other hand, had made it
clear that I was adamantly against the idea and that I would do anything to
defend Mosul and with the policy I pursued, I aimed to make sure that Turks would
have no dreams about those lands not today, not in the future. Rickett must have convinced Turks
that he had a big influence on you and Bonar Law, and Turks thought that if
they went to London, they could somehow take back Mosul. Of course, I cannot
know how much you know about what's going on. The only thing I know is that you
wouldn't deliberately try to make my job more difficult and harm the interests
of your country. Please stay away from this oil adventure. Many disgraceful acts are
involved in this matter that you are unaware of and which can stain an innocent
person sooner or later. Rickett is most certainly an unreliable person. I know what he has
been saying to Turks and what he has been saying to Sir G. Armstrong.383
The many
disgraceful acts that Lord Curzon referred to were the dirty tricks that the
British deep state staged behind closed doors.
Another important detail was that British
intelligence had illegally intercepted the Turkish telegrams. With a special
radio-telegram decoding system that the British installed in Istanbul, they
could intercept and decode the telegrams sent by the Turkish government to
Lausanne and sent them to London before the Turkish delegation could get them in Lausanne. After
they got their instructions, they would sit down at the table, fully aware of
the leverages the Turks had. Rumbold, head of the British delegation at
Lausanne, was happily announcing this to his friend Lancelot Oliphant in the
Foreign Office on July 18:
The
information we obtained at the psychological moments from secret sources was
invaluable to us, and put us in the position of a man who is playing Bridge and
knows the cards in his adversary's hand.384
This
allowed Lord Curzon and his assistant Rumbold to know when Turks could afford
to be more flexible. Closely monitoring their future strategies, based on this
knowledge they would either insist on a condition, or give up knowing that
there would be no point pressing İsmet Pasha. This information also enabled the
British deep state to identify points which the Turkish side would be more
willing to discuss. Evidently, the British deep state didn't hesitate to apply
its sinister intelligence policies even at the peace negotiations and tried to
win Mosul through plots and tricks. This was more than a desire to obtain
control over oil revenues and trade routes. Mosul was the first step in a
100-year-old plan against Turkey.