The Talks Begin

The new Turkish state had won the battle for its independence and was thus recognized by the Western states - except for one: Britain.

This attitude of the British continued throughout the Lausanne negotiations. London's administration was determined not to treat Turkey as an equal or a sovereign state, and because of this attitude the negotiations risked suspension on more than one occasion, and even came to a halt in February 1923.³⁶⁵

Unsurprisingly, the sessions on Mosul witnessed some of the most heated and tense exchanges.

British Prime Minister Bonar Law and the Secretary of State for the Colonies instructed Lord Curzon -who was the representative of Britain at Lausanne- that the negotiations should continue without suspension and the Turkish side should be persuaded. At the time, the Secretary of State for the Colonies wrongly believed that the Turkish government would waive its claims on Mosul in exchange for 20% of the oil revenues.³⁶⁶

İsmet İnönü and his aide Rıza Nur, who represented the Turkish side, maintained that Mosul was a Turkish vilayet and that all the Kurds living there were Turkish citizens. The delegation of the Turkish Parliament explained in detail the Turkish case with political, historical, ethnographical, geographical, economic and military evidence.

İsmet Pasha clarified his point with the following words:

The Grand Assembly of the Turkish Republic is the government of Kurds as much as it is Turks'. Kurds also have representatives in the Grand National Assembly. Kurdish people and their representatives in the Assembly do not accept the separation of their brothers in Mosul vilayet from the mainland.³⁶⁷

However, Lord Curzon, in an attempt to rebut the argument of İsmet Pasha, claimed that the Kurdish representatives at the Turkish Parliament did not represent the Kurdish people, that they had been appointed by Mustafa Kemal, did not have rights to representation and even implied that their election was dubious: 'As to the Kurdish representatives of Ankara, I ask myself how they were elected'.³⁶⁸

Yusuf Ziya Bey, who was a Kurdish MP representing Bitlis, gave the perfect answer to this allegation during his speech at the Parliament on January 25, 1923:

Apparently, our delegates in Lausanne didn't give the necessary answer to these accusations. We are the true representatives of the Kurdish lands, and we are here not by appointment, but by election. We took part in the elections under no pressure. If Kurdish people wanted separation, they wouldn't have participated in this election. Kurdish people participated in these elections despite all the efforts of British with their offers of gold. Kurds share the same goal as their Turkish brothers.³⁶⁹

Statements of the other Kurdish MPs that gave speeches at the Parliament should also be remembered. One notable example is Diyab Ağa, the 70-year-old Dersim representative, who was also one of the symbolic names of the Turkish Independence War. He said:

We all know and say that our religion, our religious affairs, origins and ancestors are all one. We have no differences or quarrels. Our name, religion, our God is One.

When the MPs asked Diyab Ağa what he said to the delegation that went to Lausanne, he responded as follows:

May God help them. May God give the best result. Thank God, the ones that went there are good people, pious and devout… We are all one. There is no question of Turkish or Kurdish identity. We are all one; we are brothers (interrupted by applause and 'bravo's). A man might have five, ten sons. One might be called Hasan, another Ahmed, Mehmed, Hüseyin. But they are all one. This is how we are. There is no difference between us (chants of 'bravo'). But enemies are plotting to turn us against each other. They are trying to sow animosity by saying 'you are like that, I'm like this etc.'… We are brothers. Our religion, culture is one. Some people don't know this. They say a lot of things, but they do not know. It is not how it is. La ilaha illa Allah Muhammad ar-Rasul Allah [God is One and Muhammad is His Messenger]. That is it. (Deafening applause and bravos).³⁷⁰

Süleyman Necati (Güneri) Bey, an Erzurum MP who later took the stage, said the 'majority of the people that voted for him were Kurdish', emphasized the concept of 'brotherhood of land' and reiterated that Turks and Kurds had the same history, that they weren't different people, that there weren't racial minorities in Turkey.

Yusuf Ziya Bey, a Bitlis MP, during another speech, said the following about minorities based on language and racial differences:

Europeans say, 'The biggest minority in Turkey is the Kurds'. I am a true Kurd. And as a Kurdish member of the Parliament, I can assure you that Kurds do not want anything. They only want the welfare and safety of Turks, their big brothers (Loud applause). We, Kurds, gladly trampled all the rights Europe wanted to give to us with that excuse of a treaty, called Sévres, and returned it back to them. Remember how we fought in Al Jazeera (Arabian Peninsula) (Another round of applause). Remember how we sacrificed ourselves and joined the Turks, we didn't leave them, and didn't want to leave them. We don't and won't want to leave them (Another round of applause). As I finish my words, I'm kindly asking our delegates [in Lausanne], to make sure that when the minority issue comes up, they make it clear that Kurds have no claims or demands and that they repeat my words here as a spokesperson for the Kurdish people… ³⁷¹

Durak (Sakarya) Bey, who was an Erzurum MP, said that throughout the history of Islam, Turks and Kurds mingled and families became one in Anatolia.³⁷²

In a motion submitted on behalf of Mardin MPs, the Turkish delegation at the Conference of Lausanne was asked to declare that Turks and Kurds were one and a whole. Van MP Hakkı Ungan Bey said that it should be made clear in Lausanne that Kurds cannot be differentiated from Turks.³⁷³

Without doubt, neither the Kurdish population in Mosul, nor those in Anatolia, saw themselves any different than the Turks nor it was possible to separate them from each other.³⁷⁴ The indigenous people wanted to live under the same roof as the Turks and Kurds just like before, in other words they wanted to continue to live under Turkish rule. Even Arabs didn't want the British mandate and declared 'it is either Turkish rule or independence'. So much so, it became a common occurrence for the Kurds conscripted by the Iraqi government to switch to Turks' side.³⁷⁵

Before the war, in the region covering Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, the languages used for writing had been Turkish, Arabic and Persian. However, the British in the region took it on themselves to develop the Kurdish language and its written form. After a while, the British authorities turned Kurdish into a communication tool. Although the local people insisted using Arabic and Turkish in their daily lives and correspondences, the British deep state was adamant on Kurdish. They stipulated that even the newspapers be printed in Kurdish. Again, the British deep state worked to remove Turkish as the written language and introduced a ban on its use in private correspondences. The British deep state also sought to cancel Turkish as the official language in the region and pursued a deliberate policy of annihilation targeting Turks and Turkish in the vilayet of Mosul.

Academician and author İhsan Şerif Kaymaz explains the state of affairs as follows:

It is clear that Britain, having understood that Kurdistan will not be established any time soon, is making long-term plans in a bid to create a national Kurdish identity so that Kurdistan can be built. The fruits of these efforts will be reaped in a couple of decades and a process that will create serious problems for the future of both Turkey and the region will thus be started.³⁷⁶

Two people that lived together for almost a thousand years, that mixed and built families together, were forcefully torn apart according to a deep plan amidst the background of war. The architect of the plan was the British deep state, the perpetrator of all separations and divisions. For the sake of its interests, it accepted dividing a nation, and indeed as following pages will study further on, threatened and slaughtered them in a bid to make them indebted to itself. The British deep state has been the architect of divisive policies throughout history. No one could stand up to them and this mafia structure was never held to account for its activities. That's why this horrible policy continues today. Today, the plots around Southeastern Anatolia are the same as those concocted for Mosul in the early 20^th century. The British deep state has been behind each and every one of them.

The strategy that the British deep state pursued in Lausanne to drive a wedge between the Turks and Kurds must be well studied, because the games of those days are once again being played in Southeastern Anatolia through the PKK.

British Intrigues

İsmet Pasha, the head of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne, sent a telegram to Turkey on December 28, 1922. He was convinced that the British had absolutely no intention of leaving Mosul. Only a small border correction in North Mosul would be made and the issue would be discussed amicably.

Shortly thereafter, British General Townshend made a surprising statement to İsmet Pasha. He said that Britain would give up on Mosul, that they would not be the cause of another war. He added that within a year British forces would withdraw from Mosul and following that, the Arabs would riot against King Faisal and the Turks would be able to enter Mosul without a problem.³⁷⁷

Clearly, the British deep state had a secret agenda. The members of the deep state would employ every tactic to gain the upper hand in the tense negotiations and resorted to all methods to bewilder and put the Turkish delegates on the wrong track. Indeed, in another telegram, İsmet Pasha said the British sought to remove the Mosul issue from the scope of Lausanne; it was to be discussed later and turned into an issue between the two states.³⁷⁸

Nevertheless, İsmet Pasha saw through their plans, didn't find their suggestions convincing and resorted to the assistance of the French government as a first step. However, France said that the Mosul issue should be resolved between the Turks and the British.

At the same time, dissidents were getting louder in British parliament. Although Curzon claimed that it was because of İsmet Pasha's obstinacy that the Mosul issue was still a problem, it was viewed as a failure of Curzon at the British Parliament and a campaign against him started. On December 8, 1922, former Prime Minister Bonar Law wrote a letter to Curzon and made his stance on the issue very clear:

… There is a great campaign started here against you. Most recently, the letter Gounaris wrote to you on February 15 was publicized. The claim that you were the reason behind the Greek failure and not Lloyd George is being used as a weapon against you. A parliamentary question was submitted to investigate whether the Cabinet was aware of those letters. And I said, yes. The issue was investigated but no conclusion could be reached. It is very important evidence for us that your name is not mentioned not only in the Foreign Office list, but also in the lists that Horne and Austen left to their successors. So, rest assured. They can never blame you at all for this issue.³⁷⁹

It appears that Curzon was under immense pressure by the British deep state and was forced not to compromise on the Mosul issue. Because of this pressure, Curzon did his best to not give away Mosul at Lausanne, as it was an important leverage for the British deep state.

Seeing that there was no agreeing with Lord Curzon over Mosul, İsmet Pasha sent Turkish economist Rüstem Bey and Şeref Bey, the former Minister for Trade and Railways, to Bonar Law, the British PM who didn't wish for the negotiations to be suspended. This move angered Lord Curzon to no end. He wrote a stern letter to the British diplomat Sir Eyre Crowe on January 11, 1923 and said that unless the talks with the Turkish representatives were ended, he would withdraw from the negotiations about Mosul.³⁸⁰

Later Curzon sent another letter with the same harsh tone on January 17, 1923 to Walter Hulme Long, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.³⁸¹ He said:

As a former colleague and friend of yours, can I ask you, how can you stick your nose in matters that I'm dealing with here? The other day, Rickett, with whom you are also acquainted, was here. Going behind my back and deceiving İsmet Pasha, he convinced him to send three representatives to London, with whom I'm sure you are familiar with.³⁸² These representatives went to London to offer oil concessions in exchange for the return of Mosul to Turks. I, on the other hand, had made it clear that I was adamantly against the idea and that I would do anything to defend Mosul and with the policy I pursued, I aimed to make sure that Turks would have no dreams about those lands not today, not in the future. Rickett must have convinced Turks that he had a big influence on you and Bonar Law, and Turks thought that if they went to London, they could somehow take back Mosul. Of course, I cannot know how much you know about what's going on. The only thing I know is that you wouldn't deliberately try to make my job more difficult and harm the interests of your country. Please stay away from this oil adventure. Many disgraceful acts are involved in this matter that you are unaware of and which can stain an innocent person sooner or later. Rickett is most certainly an unreliable person. I know what he has been saying to Turks and what he has been saying to Sir G. Armstrong.³⁸³

The many disgraceful acts that Lord Curzon referred to were the dirty tricks that the British deep state staged behind closed doors.

Another important detail was that British intelligence had illegally intercepted the Turkish telegrams. With a special radio-telegram decoding system that the British installed in Istanbul, they could intercept and decode the telegrams sent by the Turkish government to Lausanne and sent them to London before the Turkish delegation could get them in Lausanne. After they got their instructions, they would sit down at the table, fully aware of the leverages the Turks had. Rumbold, head of the British delegation at Lausanne, was happily announcing this to his friend Lancelot Oliphant in the Foreign Office on July 18:

The information we obtained at the psychological moments from secret sources was invaluable to us, and put us in the position of a man who is playing Bridge and knows the cards in his adversary's hand.³⁸⁴

This allowed Lord Curzon and his assistant Rumbold to know when Turks could afford to be more flexible. Closely monitoring their future strategies, based on this knowledge they would either insist on a condition, or give up knowing that there would be no point pressing İsmet Pasha. This information also enabled the British deep state to identify points which the Turkish side would be more willing to discuss. Evidently, the British deep state didn't hesitate to apply its sinister intelligence policies even at the peace negotiations and tried to win Mosul through plots and tricks. This was more than a desire to obtain control over oil revenues and trade routes. Mosul was the first step in a 100-year-old plan against Turkey.